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NOTE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR WORKING MOTHERS: DOES
GUERRA'S PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
RATIONALE EXTEND TO CHILDREARING
LEAVE BENEFITS?
STEPHEN KEYES
INTRODUCTION

Recognizing the increased burden faced by pregnant women and new
mothers in the workplace,' Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment of 1978 ["PDA"]2 to establish that discrimination
based on pregnancy is by definition a form of illegal sex discrimination.3
Under the PDA, women "affected by pregnancy" must be treated by
1. The presence of women in the work force has grown dramatically over the last
forty years. Perhaps the most striking feature of this transition has been the increase in
the labor force participation rate of women---especially those who potentially fulfill dual
roles as both employee and mother. In 1970, only half the women between 18 and 24
years old were in the work force; by 1995, it is projected that more than 80% of the
women in this age range will be working. See BNA, Work & Family: A ChangingDynamic 13 (1986) [hereinafter BNA, Work & Family]. In addition, in 1940, 8.6% of women with children under 18 were in the labor force, as compared to nearly 60% in 1985.
See id. at 15. Similarly, as of 1987, roughly 50% of married women with children one
year of age or younger were in the labor force, as compared to about 30% in 1975. See
BNA, Pregnancy and Employment: The Complete Handbook on Discrimination,Maternity Leave and Health and Safety 3 (1987) [hereinafter BNA, Pregnancy & Employment];
see also Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into Account, 54 Fordham L.
Rev. 699, 705 (1986) (discussing disparate labor force participation rates for women
based on family status) [hereinafter Dowd, Maternity Leave]; Hayghe Children in 2Worker Familiesand Real Family Income, Monthly Lab. Rev., Dec. 1989, at 48, 49 (discussing proliferation of dual-career families and displaying data in Table 1); Shaw &
Shapiro, Women's Work Plans: ContrastingExpectations and Actual Work Experience,
Monthly Lab. Rev., Nov. 1987, at 10 ("Having more children reduces labor force participation"). See generally Freedman, The Changing Composition of the Family and the
Workplace, in The Parental Leave Crisis 23-33 (E. Zigler & M. Frank eds. 1988) (discussing the rapid trend away from the traditional family unit with mother at home and father
at work); Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 65-68 (referring to conflict between career dedication and family balance) [hereinafter Schwartz, Management Women].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1978)). The PDA
provides in pertinent part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefits programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
3. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in Legislative
History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 150 (1979) [hereinafter House
Report]; S. Rep. No. 331, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1977), reprintedin Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 40-41 [hereinafter Senate Report].

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

their employers "the same for all employment-related purposes" as other
employees who are "similar in their ability or inability to work." 4
Despite the PDA's seemingly straightforward language-which appears to require equal treatment of pregnant employees-the Supreme
Court has recently construed the PDA to ensure more than equal treatment of women affected by pregnancy. In CaliforniaFederalSavings and
Loan Association v. Guerra,5 the Court upheld a California statute requiring employers to provide up to four months of leave to female employees
disabled by pregnancy, even though the statute does not require employers to grant leaves of similar duration to men with equally debilitating
conditions.6 Significantly, the Court offered a broad, yet vague, endorsement of preferential treatment for women workers affected by pregnancy,
with the aim of ensuring equal opportunity for women in the labor market.7 In the wake of Guerra, however, federal courts have disagreed on
whether such preferential treatment should extend beyond the period of
actual physical disability due to pregnancy to encompass the childrearing
years. 8
This Note considers whether, after Guerra, women may be provided
with childrearing leave benefits on a preferential basis, and analyzes how
the resolution of this question affects employer policies, current state
laws, and proposed legislation regarding parental leave. Part I briefly
reviews the background and development of federal legislation prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, focusing on the 1978 PDA. Part
II examines how the Supreme Court's decision in Guerra raises the question of whether working women may be provided with childrearing leave
benefits to the exclusion of working fathers. Part III analyzes how the
competing perspectives of equal treatment and equal opportunity are implicated in the debate over childrearing leave, discussing recent federal
court decisions applying these competing views. This Part concludes
that, under either perspective, working men must be afforded the same
childrearing benefits as women if the purposes of federal sex discrimination legislation are to be advanced. Part IV explores a range of possibili4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
5. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
6. See Cal. Gov't Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
7. 479 U.S. at 289 ("The entire thrust... behind [the PDA] is to guarantee women
the basic right to participate fully and equally in the work force, without denying them
the fundamental right to full participation in family life" (quoting 123 Cong. Rec. 29,658
(1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams)).
8. Compare Schafer v. Board of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1990) (denying
such preferential treatment) with Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 877 F.2d 1307 (6th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 728 (1990) (granting such preferential treatment). See
infra notes 64-72, 93-98 and accompanying text. See generally Remmers, Pregnancy Discriminationand ParentalLeave, 11 Indus. Rel. L.J. 377, 400 (1989) ("issue whether Title
VII should invalidate parental/child-rearing leaves for women only is not without controversy") [hereinafter Remmers, ParentalLeave]; M. Zimmer, C. Sullivan, & R. Richards, Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination 354 (1988) (questioning
whether fathers must be offered childrearing leave when women receive such leave).
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ties for defining what is meant by "pregnancy disability," a term not
clearly defined by the Guerra Court. Part V suggests how employer policies, state laws, and proposed federal legislation should address the issue
of allowing childrearing leave to both sexes. Finally, this Note concludes
that courts must distinguish between childbearing leave and childrearing
leave in order to remain consistent with the goals of Title VII.
I.

BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
LEGISLATION AND THE PDA

Title VII provided the first comprehensive protection against sex discrimination in the workplace. 9 As originally enacted, the legislation
viewed discrimination in the workplace as a "series of isolated and distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill will" on the part of the
employer." ° Subsequently, the Supreme Court recognized two separate
theories of discrimination under Title VII: disparate treatment, where an
employer treats an employee less favorably because of membership in a
protected class such as women or minorities; and disparate impact,
where a facially neutral employer policy operates in practice to the disadvantage of members of a protected class. 1
Discrimination based on pregnancy, however, did not squarely fit the
type of discrimination that Congress originally contemplated when enacting Title VII, as Congress did not explicitly refer in the statute to
discrimination based on pregnancy. Initially, the Supreme Court invoked a narrow definition of "sex discrimination" under Title VII: In
GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert, 2 the Court let stand an employer policy
that excluded pregnancy disability from otherwise comprehensive disability coverage, reasoning that the policy distinguished not between men
and women, but between "pregnant women and non-pregnant persons."1 3 The Court determined that differential treatment based on pregnancy did not on its face amount to discriminatory treatment based on
sex, since gender and pregnancy are not synonymous.' 4 As a result of
Gilbert,pregnant employees claiming discrimination were forced to challenge employer policies under a disparate impact theory. Accordingly,
plaintiffs had to show that employer policies, while facially neutral, were
applied in a discriminatory fashion to exclude a disproportionate number
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
10. See S.Rep. No. 1137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970), reprintedin B. Schlei & P.
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 2 n.7 (2d ed. 1983); see also Slack v.
Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 1975) (using direct evidence of differential treatment to show discriminatory motive).
11. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 & n. 15
(1977).
12. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
13. Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (upholding similar public employment disability plan against a fourteenth amendment challenge,
reasoning that "pregnancy" was not the equivalent of "sex")).
14. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
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of women
from employment opportunities or employment-related
5
benefits. 1
Responding to public outcry over Gilbert, Congress effectively overruled the Gilbert holding by passing the PDA. 16 The PDA, which
amended various definitions set forth in section 2000e of Title VII, makes

clear that the term "because of sex" includes "because of or on the basis

of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."' 7 It further
adds that women "affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same [for employment-related purposes
as] other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work."' 8 The amendment relieves aggrieved employees of the burden of
having to prove disparate impact 19 to invalidate employer policies that
facially discriminate against women based on pregnancy.
Courts initially interpreting the PDA were divided on whether the new
amendment mandated mere neutrality of treatment for pregnant employees, or whether it required that pregnancy be treated specially in some
way by employers.20 In CaliforniaFederalSavings and Loan Association
v. Guerra,2 the Supreme Court resolved this debate to a limited extent.2 2
15. See, eg., Nashville Gas Co. v Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141-43 (1977) (invoking disparate impact analysis in pregnancy discrimination case); see also House Report, supra note
3, at 3, reprintedin Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 149
(1979) (explaining that Satty applied disparate impact approach to pregnancy).
16. See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3-4, reprinted in Legislative History of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 40-41 (1979).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
18. Id.
19. See House Report, supra note 3, at 3, reprintedin Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 149 (1979). See generally B. Schlei & P. Grossman,
Employment Discrimination Law 98-102, 112-16 (1983) (discussing plaintiff's burden in
proving disparate impact case).
20. Some courts found that women affected by pregnancy need only be treated the
same, based on their ability to work, as other employees. See, e.g., Conners v. University
of Tenn. Press, 558 F. Supp. 38, 40-41 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (facially neutral leave policy
insufficient for childbearing held not discriminatory despite harsh impact on pregnant
employees); Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 537 F. Supp. 206, 214 (E.D.
Mo. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); Barone v. Hackett, 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1765, 1770 (D.R.I. 1982) (PDA requires only comparable treatment). Other courts held that pregnancy must be recognized as a condition unique to
women and thus must be treated with special consideration to ensure fairness to women.
See, e.g., Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819-20 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(facially neutral leave policy nonetheless discriminatory because inadequate for maternity
purposes); Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 946, 957 (D.S.C. 1980) (prohibiting denial of
benefits to women disabled by pregnancy, regardless of how employer treats employees
with other disabilities), aff'd, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150
(1983); Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 214 Mont. 238, 259, 692 P.2d
1243, 1255 (1984) (neutral policy prohibiting leaves to new employees held discriminatory because of disparate impact on women), vacated, 479 U.S. 1050, aff'd on rehearing,
228 Mont. 505, 744 P.2d 871 (1987).
21. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
22. See infra notes 23-45 and accompanying text for discussion of Guerra's resolution
of this debate.
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II.

GUERRA's

REASONING AND ITS UNCERTAIN IMPLICATIONS FOR
CHILDREARING LEAVE

In Guerra the Supreme Court reasoned that the PDA was enacted to
promote equal opportunity for pregnant women in the workplace, insofar
23
as the statute applies to women physically disabled due to pregnancy.
This equal opportunity goal, the Guerra Court found, justified the preferential treatment granted to female employees by a California statute requiring employers to provide up to four months of unpaid disability leave
to pregnant or postpartum women. 24 In limiting its holding to situations
involving actual pregnancy disability, however, the Court did not address
whether considerations of equal opportunity should extend beyond the
point of pregnancy disability to the subsequent childrearing context. Accordingly, it is still unclear after Guerra whether preferential treatment
akin to that found in the California statute may be afforded to female
employees in the provision of childrearing leave.
A.

Employer Policy at Issue in Guerra

Guerra involved Lillian Garland, a woman employed by a savings and
loan institution, who took a pregnancy disability leave in 1982. When
Garland tried to return to work three months later, immediately following her pregnancy disability, she was informed that her job had been
filled and that no similar positions were available. She filed a state administrative complaint charging that her employer had violated a state
statute requiring employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy."5
The statute, which essentially mirrored the PDA, prohibited employers from "refus[ing] to allow a female employee affected by pregnancy
... [t]o take a leave on account of pregnancy" for up to four months.2 6
The employer policy in Guerra, which addressed only disability leaves,
provided such leave on a gender-neutral basis and established no maximum duration for disability leaves.27 The policy failed to afford female
employees the four months of leave that the statute required, however,
because it provided no immediate reinstatement right to a pregnant female at the conclusion of her pregnancy disability leave.2" The main issue in Guerra, therefore, was whether the California pregnancy
23. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 284-85.
24. See id. at 288.

25. See id at 278.
26. Cal. Gov't Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). Both the California
and the federal statutes protect pregnant employees from discrimination in the workplace. Compare Cal. Gov't Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991) (unlawful for
employer to refuse to provide pregnancy leave) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (unlawful to discriminate based on pregnancy).
27. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 562, 565 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 758 F.2d 390, 397 (1985), aff'd, 479 U.S. 272,
292 (1987).
28. See id.
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discrimination statute was inconsistent with, and thus pre-empted 29 by,
Title VII as amended by the PDA.
The Guerra Court upheld the California statute, finding that even
though it effectively allowed employers to provide greater leave benefits
to women than to men, such treatment is not in violation of Title VII's
prohibition against sex discrimination because it ultimately serves the Title VII goal of equality of employment opportunity for protected
classes.3" Significantly, the Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the PDA, agreeing that the PDA provides "a floor beneath which
pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above which
they may not rise." 3 1 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the PDA
provides minimum guarantees for employees affected by pregnancy, and
does not limit the scope of benefits allowable to affected employees.
B. Equal Opportunity Goals Advanced
The Guerra Court held that although neither the words of the PDA
nor the legislative history of the amendment indicated express Congressional intent to provide preferential treatment for pregnant employees,32
the notion of favoring pregnant employees under the PDA was consistent
with the overarching goals of Title VII. As the Court observed, the aim
of Title VII was to "'achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of... employees over other employees.' ,3
The Guerra Court also found the concept of preferential treatment for
pregnant women to be consonant with prior Supreme Court precedent
endorsing voluntary employer affirmative action as a means of breaking
down barriers to employment for members of protected classes.3 4 In
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,3 5 one case relied on by the
Guerra Court, the Supreme Court had recognized that Congress did not
"intend[ ] to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps to ac29. The Guerra Court explained its pre-emption analysis succinctly. Congress, it
said, may pre-empt state law by express terms, by leaving "no room" for state legislation,
or by passing federal laws such that in practice compliance with both federal and state
law may not be possible. The Court determined that Guerra presented the third possible
basis for pre-emption, but found that compliance with both federal and state law was
possible. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280-81.
30. Id. at 288-90.
31. Id. at 285 (quoting Court of Appeals decision, 758 F.2d at 396).
32. See id. at 286-87.
33. California Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 288 (1987) (quoting Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S 424, 429-30 (1971)).
34. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text for discussion of the precedent upon
which the Guerra Court relied.
35. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In Weber, the Court upheld, against a reverse discrimination claim, an employer's collectively-bargained affirmative action plan which required
that minority workers be given half of all open slots in an in-plant craft training program
until black employees' proportional representation in skilled craft positions mirrored the
percentage of blacks in the local labor force.
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complish the goal that Congress designed Title VII to achieve." 36 Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in Weber concluded that Title VII's prohibition against discrimination "does not condemn all private, voluntary,
race-conscious affirmative action plans."3 7 Thus, the Weber Court approved the employer's affirmative action plan as preferential treatment
designed to "eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories. "" The Weber Court did, however, stress that several factors should confine the scope of such a plan: 1) the plan must not
"unnecessarily trammel the interests" of white employees (for instance,
by requiring replacement of white employees with black employees); 2)
it must not "create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees;" and 3) it must be a temporary measure not intended to maintain a
racial balance, but "simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance." 3 9
The Guerra Court also cited a number of other civil rights cases in
support of its conclusion that limited preferential treatment for protected
groups of employees was consistent with Title VII. 4 In approving such
preferential treatment, the Court invoked the principle, previously articulated by a minority of the Court, that a "'realistic understanding of
conditions found in today's labor environment warrants taking pregnancy into account in fashioning disability policies.' "941
In a case decided later in the same Term as Guerra,Johnson v. Transportation Agency,42 the Supreme Court continued its endorsement of
preferential treatment as a means of ensuring equal opportunity in the
labor market, thus solidifying the approach taken in Guerra. The Johnson Court upheld, against a Title VII challenge, a county agency's affirmative action plan that took gender into account when promoting female
employees to various transportation dispatcher positions over male employees with superior test scores. The plan was explicitly designed to
eliminate underrepresentation of women in traditional job categories.
Reaffirming the principles set forth in Weber, the Johnson Court held
that as long as such a plan was limited by the factors established in
Weber, it is "fully consistent with Title VII. ' 4 3
36. Id. at 204.
37. Id. at 208. But see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 485
(1989) (imposing limits on use of voluntary affirmative action in awarding of government
contracts).
38. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
39. Id. at 208.
40. See Guerra,479 U.S. at 288 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
763 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Lau v. Nichols,

414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974)).
41. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 289 (quoting GeneralElec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 159
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

42. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
43. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640-42.
Although affirmative action, as the embodiment of the equal opportunity approach,
remains highly controversial today, federal court decisions have consistently upheld a
number of applications of preferential treatment in the workplace, and the doctrine seems
secured as a fact of modem employer practices. See, eg., Sheetmetal Workers' Int'l
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Significantly, although the Guerra Court relied on the affirmative action principles enunciated in Weber and later endorsed in Johnson, it did
not examine whether the preferential treatment afforded pregnant women by the California statute "unnecessarily trammeled" the interests of
male employees. Nor did the Court question whether the statute created
an "absolute bar" to the advancement of non-pregnant employees, or
whether it existed simply to eliminate a "manifest imbalance" in the
work force.' Therefore, Guerra can arguably be read to broaden the
circumstances under which preferential treatment could be afforded to
employees affected by pregnancy, since it endorsed such treatment without imposing upon it the limits supposedly required by the prior decision
in Weber and endorsed by the subsequent ruling in Johnson.4"
C.

The Imprecise Definition of "PregnancyDisability"

Significantly, the Guerra Court expressly limited its holding to situations involving actual physical disability due to pregnancy, 46 noting that
both the PDA and the challenged California statute confined their coverage to benefits related to "actual physical disability" 47 due to pregnancy.
The PDA, however, does not define "actual physical disability" beyond
simply requiring that employees affected by pregnancy be treated the
same as "other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work."'4 1 Unfortunately, the Court also made no attempt to
define this key phrase, thereby offering no guidance for determining
when pregnancy disability ends.
As this Note suggests in Part IV, the ambiguity surrounding the term
"actual physical disability" frustrates a determination of when a woman's pregnancy disability ends, and, consequently, when childrearing
begins. Assuming that some agreement can be reached as to what constitutes the beginning and end of the pregnancy disability period, the central question is still whether women may be afforded preferential
treatment in the provision of childrearing leave benefits after the actual
pregnancy disability period has officially ended.
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 475 (1986) (Title VII does not preclude district court from
ordering preferential relief to eliminate effects of past discrimination); International Ass'n
of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1988) (Title VII does not preclude
entry of consent decree giving preferential treatment to eliminate effects of past discrimination). But see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 485 (1989) (imposing limits on use of voluntary affirmative action in awarding of government contracts).
44. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 288-90. The Court, in approving the California statute's
scheme of "taking pregnancy into account," 479 U.S. at 289, makes no mention of the
limiting criteria set forth in Weber and subsequently required in Johnson.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 290.
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (emphasis added).
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III. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY VERSUS EQUAL TREATMENT: DOES
GUERRA's PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT RATIONALE
EXTEND TO THE CHILDREARING LEAVE
CONTEXT?

Whether Guerra'spreferential treatment rationale should be extended
to apply to pure childrearing leave benefits hinges on which of two competing doctrines interpreting Title VII-equal opportunity or equal treatment 4 9 -is adopted as a starting point for analysis. The equal
opportunity doctrine has as its goal the provision of equal opportunities
for women and other minorities to participate and advance in the labor
market.5 ° Equal treatment analysis, on the other hand, requires that
members of protected classes be treated on par with other participants in
the labor market." As the following analysis illustrates, the two doctrines, although frequently consonant with one another, collide when applied to employer
policies involving leave benefits for childrearing
2
purposes.49. The equal opportunity versus equal treatment debate has raged for years and has
spawned a terminology all its own. See e.g., Dowd, Maternity Leave, supra note 1,at
715-20 (comparing equal treatment view with "sex differences" view); Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1143-48 (1986) (summarizing "special treatment" versus equal
treatment debate) [hereinafter Finley, Equality Theory]; Taub, From ParentalLeaves to
NurturingLeaves, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 381, 381 (1984) (discussing "special
treatment"/"positive action" approach and "equal treatment"/"comparative treatment"
approach) [hereinafter Taub, NurturingLeaves].
50. See, eg., Dowd, Maternity Leave, supra note 1, at 718 (sex differences approach
argues that pregnancy must be taken into account to achieve equality of opportunity);
Finley, Equality Theory, supra note 49, at 1147 (special treatment approach seeks positive
action to take childbearing into account to break down barriers to workplace success);
Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination,and Affirmative Action Under Title V!:
The Access Principle,65 Tex. L. Rev. 41, 63 (1986) (distinguishing between equality of
opportunity and equality of results).
51. See, e.g., Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct of
1978, 94 Yale L.J. 929, 932 (1985) ("parity" approach demands that hiring and firing
practices and leave requirements be administered on an equal basis) [hereinafter Note,
Employment Equality]; Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct,
83 Colum. L. Rev. 690, 704-09 (1983) ("assimilationist" view requires that pregnant employees, like any other disabled employee, be treated according to their "ability to work")
[hereinafter Note, Sexual Equality].
52. For a general discussion of the equal treatment/equal opportunity debate as applied to pregnancy disability benefits, see Dowd, Maternity Leave, supra note 1; Krieger
& Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the
Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 513 (1983) [hereinafter Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy]; Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy
and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc. Change
325 (1984) [hereinafter Williams, Equality's Riddle]. The debate was ultimately resolved
to some extent by CaliforniaFederal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra,479 U.S. 272
(1987). See supra notes 23-45 and accompanying text. The present discussion, however,
takes the preferential treatment of pregnancy-disabled employees as a starting point and
considers whether that preference should extend beyond the disability period.
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A. Equal Treatment View
1. Legislative and Judicial Bases
The equal treatment approach to employment discrimination takes the
view that protected categories of employees must be treated the same as
other employees for all employment-related purposes, without regard 5to3
the distribution of minorities or women in particular job categories.
Proponents of this approach believe that eradication of discrimination in
the workplace requires only that employers evaluate employees for hire,
promotion, or benefits eligibility without regard to their sex, race, age,
religion, or handicap, and that employers ensure that all employment
policies are applied in a neutral fashion. 4
The legislative basis for the equal treatment approach is the plain language of Title VII itself, which prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.""5 According to the
equal treatment view, this language means that employers may not take
sex, race, or other prohibited factors into account in employment-related
decisions, because to do so would be to "discriminate" based on that
factor. Accordingly, even if an employer desired a racially balanced
work force and thus lowered hiring standards to achieve this goal, such
an action would constitute discrimination-no matter how small the differential in hiring standards and regardless of the employer's beneficent
motive-because it would not treat different categories of employees in
exactly the same manner.
Federal court decisions have adopted an equal treatment approach in a
variety of employment discrimination contexts. The underlying theme of
such decisions has been that despite the policy arguments for, or emotional appeal of, providing some special treatment for women, blacks, or
other protected groups in the labor market, the facial requirements of
Title VII prohibit such favoritism, and only Congress, through legislative
amendment, can provide otherwise.5 6
2.

Application to Childrearing Leave

A starting point for analysis of the childrearing leave question under
53. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
716-17 (1978) (discriminatory differential pension contributions based on sex); MacDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 (1976) (Title VII "prohibits all racial
discrimination in employment, without exception for any group of particular employees") (emphasis in original).
54. See Williams, Equality'sRiddle, supra note 52, at 331-34; Finley, Equality Theory,
supra note 49, at 1143-46.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2C)0e-2(a) (1988). See also sources cited supra note 51 (discussing
equal treatment interpretation of the PDA).
56. For further discussion of the "facial requirements" interpretation of Title VII, see
cases cited supra note 53.
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an equal treatment approach is the language of Title VII and of the PDA
itself. Title VII provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer to
"discriminate against any individual .. . because of such individual's...
sex." 57 The PDA, amending Title VII, clarifies that discrimination "because of sex" includes, but is not limited to, "because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." ' 8 The PDA further provides, however, that "women affected by pregnancy ...shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 9
Applying the language of the PDA coupled with that of Title VII, the
equal treatment view would require that men and women under a single
60
employer policy receive exactly the same access to childrearing leave.
Although the Supreme Court in Guerra6 condoned special treatment for
women disabled due to pregnancy, the equal treatment view holds that
such a preference should not apply to childrearing leave because men
may just as easily utilize these benefits. According to an equal treatment
view, not only must men be given access to such benefits in the form of
paternity leave, but they must also receive the same rights as women
under a given employer policy with respect to eligibility requirements,
duration of leave, and reinstatement after leave. 62

3. Schafer v. Board of Public Education of the School District of
Pittsburgh6 3 as an Application of Equal Treatment
Principles to Childrearing Leave
A recent Third Circuit decision, Schafer v. Board of Public Education
of the School District of Pittsburgh, applied an equal treatment approach
to the question of discrimination in providing childrearing leave bene57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).

58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
59. Ia (emphasis added).
60. Of course, the phrase "affected by pregnancy" could be broadly construed to include women who have already given birth and who desire childrearing leave even after
their disability period. Clearly, one way in which women are "affected" by pregnancy is

that they have new infants to care for. The legislative history of the PDA seems to reject
this broader definition, however, as evidenced by House Report language indicating that
the PDA was "intended to be limited to effects upon the woman who is herself pregnant,
bearing a child, or has a related medical condition." House Report, supra note 3, at 5,
reprinted in Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 151
(1979).
Moreover, other passages of the PDA's legislative history suggest that childrearing
leave benefits must be afforded on an equal treatment basis. The Senate Report states

that employers providing voluntary childrearing leave could continue providing it "as
long as it is done on a nondiscriminatory basis"-meaning, presumably, an equal treatment basis. See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 4, reprintedin Legislative History of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 41.

61. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
62. Eligibility for leave, duration of leave, and reinstatement after leave are all doubtless considered "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," discrimination with respect to which is prohibited. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)() (1988).
63. 903 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1990).
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fits. 6' Schafer, a male teacher, requested from his school board an unpaid leave of absence for the purpose of childrearing. Unable to locate
suitable child care, Schafer wanted to care for his son personally, and
told the Board that he would be forced to resign if his leave were denied
because there would be no one to care for his child. When Schafer's
request was denied, he challenged as discriminatory the school board's
policy, which provided childrearing leave of up to a year for female employees only.65 In particular, the policy stated that "'leaves without
Boardpay for personalreasons relating to childbearingor childrearing...
shall be available to female teachers and otherfemale personnel.' "'66 Significantly, the policy did not require documentation of continuing disability as a condition of eligibility for maternity leave.67
The district court dismissed the case, finding the Board's policy to be
precisely the kind of preferential treatment for female employees that the
Supreme Court had endorsed in Guerra.68 A unanimous Third Circuit
reversed, however, emphasizing the key distinction between "childbearing" leave, enjoyed only by women, and pure childrearing leave, which
men can enjoy as well as women. According to the Third Circuit, the
Guerra decision, with its holding expressly limited to cases involving "actual physical disability" due to pregnancy, meant that female employees
who have recently given birth to a child may only receive preferential
treatment upon a "simultaneous showing of a continuing disability related to either the pregnancy or to the delivery of the child."' 69 The Schafer court found that the employer policy under challenge provided leave
to female employees, but not to men, "without a showing of a disability
related to pregnancy or childbearing., 70 Accordingly, it held that
Guerra was not controlling, as that decision was confined to leaves related to childbearing only.7 '
The Schafer court acknowledged the Guerra equal opportunity rationale but refused to extend it to the childrearing leave context, stating specifically that preferential treatment was meant only to accommodate
pregnancy disability and is thus "per se void for any leave granted beyond the period of actual physical disability on account of pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions." 72 Although the Schafer court
64. Id.
65. Id. at 245.
66. Id. at 245 n. 1 (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 248.
68. See Schafer v. Board of Pub. Educ., 732 F. Supp. 565, 566 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
69. Schafer, 903 F.2d at 248.
70. Id. It is noteworthy that the Third Circuit did not attempt to define "pregnancy
disability." It did, however, point out that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that
suggests that the normal maternity disability due to 'pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions' extends to one year." Id. (quoting PDA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1988)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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did not fully articulate the policy reasons underlying its decision, several
rationales support the court's holding.
4.

Policy Rationales Underlying Application of the Equal Treatment
View to Childrearing Leave

Several policy rationales support the application of the equal treatment
view to the question of childrearing leave benefits. First, a father's presence during infant care provides immeasurable support to the family.
Even though present data suggest that very few men take advantage of
available parental leave benefits,7 3 there is strong evidence that participation of the father in childrearing activities contributes tremendously to a
family's overall well-being. 4 Moreover, a father sharing infant care responsibilities may well reduce the postpartum stress experienced by the
mother, speeding her return to the work force." Finally, a father's participation has even been found to minimize marital stress 76 and maximize
on-the-job productivity.7 7
In addition, as feminist scholars have observed, requiring that men be
granted childrearing leave benefits on equal footing with women avoids
perpetuating the stereotype of women as primary caregivers and thus
marginal labor force participants.7" Admittedly, preference for pregnant
employees may be acceptable because it takes into account actual biological differences between men and women. As proponents of the equal
treatment view counter, however, no justification exists for policies offering childrearing leave to women only, because men may participate
equally in this activity and because restricting this role to women workers reinforces the idea that women are mothers first, career-holders
second.79
73. See Pleck, Fathers and Infant Care Leave, in The Parental Leave Crisis 181 (E.
Zigler & M. Frank, eds. 1988); Lawson, Baby Beckons: Why Is Daddy at Work?, N.Y.
Times, May 16, 1991, at Cl, col. 1.
74. See Brazelton, Issuesfor Working Parents,in The Parental Leave Crisis 47-50 (E.
Zigler & M. Frank, eds. 1988) [hereinafter Brazelton, Working Parents]; Pleck, Fathers
and Infant Care Leave, in The Parental Leave Crisis 180-90 (E.Zigler & M. Frank. eds.
1988); Lawson, supra note 73, at C8, col. 6.
75. See Harwood, ParentalStress and the Young Infant's Needs, in The Parental
Leave Crisis 55-71 (E.Zigler & M. Frank, eds. 1988) (exploring positive effects of father's
child care participation on family and mother well-being).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Dowd, Maternity Leave, supra note 1, at 708 & n.40; O'Brien & Madek, Pregnancy Discrimination and MaternityLeave Laws, 93 Dick. L. Rev. 311, 331 (1989); Note,
Childbearingand Childrearing: Feminists and Reform, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1145, 1180-82
(1987).
79. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., - U.S. ,
11,S. Ct.
1196, 1210 (1991). In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court expressly rejected an employer policy which took biological differences into account by excluding fertile female
workers from certain jobs with high lead exposure. The Court directly confronted the
notion of recognizing and accommodating biological differences, noting that such a stereotypical approach "historically has been the excuse for denying women equal employ-
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Finally, an equal treatment approach to childrearing leave provides
clear guidance for employers in designing and administering leave policies. While employers might occasionally prefer to offer leave benefits on
a selective basis to the most productive employees, ° an equal treatment
rule leaves no room for the uncertainties or inequities that may result
from granting an employer such discretion.
B.

Equal Opportunity View

1. Legislative and Judicial Bases
The equal opportunity approach to employment discrimination takes
the view that in order to eradicate the long-term effects of societal discrimination in the workplace, protected categories of employees who
have traditionally been victims of that discrimination may receive special
or preferential treatment in the workplace. 8" Preferential treatment, it is
argued, allows women and minorities to compete on an equal footing
with other employees and removes
discriminatory barriers to full partici82
pation in the labor market.
The legislative bases for the equal opportunity approach find their origin in Title VII, which Congress enacted primarily to eradicate the effects of discrimination in the workplace and to provide an equal chance
for protected categories of employees to succeed in the labor market. As
the legislative history of Title VII shows, for Congress "[t]he crux of the
problem [was] to open employment opportunities for [traditionally segregated groups] in occupations which have been traditionally closed to
them."8 3 Given the ultimate goals of Title VII and, hence, the PDA,
equal opportunity proponents argue that preferential treatment is permissible and even desirable in many instances to 84achieve "equal results"-not just equal treatment-in the workplace.
2.

Application to Childrearing Leave

In applying an equal opportunity approach to the issue of childrearing
leave benefits, it must first be recognized that while typical affirmative
action cases have involved preferential treatment in hiring or promoment opportunities." Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1210. For further discussion of the
perpetuation of unfavorable female stereotypes, see sources cited supra note 78.
80. See generally BNA, Pregnancy and Employment, supra note 1, at 10 (explaining
employer motives in providing benefits).
81. See Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy,supra note 52, at 519; Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 52, at 353.
82. For discussion of discriminatory labor market barriers, see supra note 81.
83. 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
84. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620-22, 639-40 (1987); United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1979). But see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 (1989) (placing further limits on use of
voluntary affirmative action in awarding of government contracts to remedy
discrimination).
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tions,"5 favoring women for childrearing leave benefits may serve to accomplish the same goals as preferential hiring and promotion. It is quite
common that women, who are still overwhelmingly the caretakers of
newborn infants, 6 are unable to continue working because they do not
receive sufficient employer-provided childrearing leave benefits to allow
them to care for infants at home for a desired time period."7 Further,
even when such leave exists, reinstatement rights may be so restrictive as
to provide virtually no job security.8 8 Although in theory men could as
easily fill the role of infant-care provider, this is rarely the case in practice, as demonstrated by historical data showing that women almost exclusively have assumed the primary role as postpartum care providers.8 9
Moreover, as long as men continue to earn higher salaries than their
wives, making it economically more sensible for women to take time off
from work, women are forced to yield to pressing economic considerations and remain home during the early months of infant care.' Thus
women are disproportionately affected by any employer policy that denies or severely limits childrearing leave because it is they who are most
likely to demand such leave.
It follows, then, that to the extent that inadequate childrearing leave
policies create underrepresentation of women in particular job categories,
employers might seek to correct this underrepresentation by providing
adequate childrearing leave to women. Appropriate measures would allow women to remain in the work force after childbirth and would entice
future mothers to accept career positions secure in the knowledge that
childrearing leave will be available when needed.
Furthermore, employers, when faced with the economic costs of providing childrearing leave,9 1 may well decide to provide these leave benefits where they are most needed and where they are most cost-effectiveto women who may be disadvantaged and who may become underrepresented in the work force if childrearing leave is not provided.9
85. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621; Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-98.
86. See Frug, Securing Job Equalityfor Women. Labor Market Hostility to Working
Mothers, 59 B.U.L. Rev. 55, 56-57 & nn.13-16, 58 & n.29 (1979) [hereinafter Frug, Labor
Market Hostility].
87. See generally Dowd, Maternity Leave, supra note 1, at 712 (citing studies showing
that many employer policies are inadequate in duration, benefits, or disability).
88. See id at 714.
89. For discussion of women's role as care providers, see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
90. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 409 (1990).
91. See BNA, Work & Family, supra note 1, at 23.
92. It may appear at first blush that employers are not forced to choose between
employees in providing childrearing leave benefits in the same way that they must choose
between candidates when making hiring or promotion decisions, and that therefore employers have no need to choose women to the exclusion of men as recipients of childrearing leave benefits. In fact, however, employers are faced with such a choice in economic
terms. Providing leave benefits costs money-in replacement, training and continued
health benefits. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 770
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3. Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp.9 3 as an Application of Equal
Opportunity Principles to Childrearing Leave
A recent Sixth Circuit decision, Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp., applied an equal opportunity approach in deciding whether an employer
may provide extended leave to women for "maternity related reasons"
without providing similarly extended leave to a disabled male employee.9 4 Harness, a male employee disabled by a heart attack, sought an
extended leave of absence beyond the ninety-day period allowed under
the employer policy for most disabilities.9 5 When his request was rejected, Harness brought a reverse discrimination suit based on his employer's maternity leave policy, which allowed female employees an
extended leave for "maternity related reasons" for up to one year, with
reinstatement rights. The phrase "maternity related reasons" was left
undefined in the employer policy. Specifically, the policy provision
stated: "If your leave is for maternity related reasons, you are entitled to
a 90-day leave to be used before and after the date of'delivery. This type
of leave may be extended up to one (1) year, provided a written request is
made each sixty days." 96
The challenged maternity leave policy did not specify whether this
leave was solely for actual physical disability related to pregnancy, nor
did it require new mothers to show a continuing physical disability to
remain eligible for the extended leave. These ambiguous features, along
with the realistic acknowledgment that a typical pregnancy disability
lasts at most a few months, indicated that the employer's policy allowed
female employees to take a pure childrearing leave immediately following
disability due to childbirth.
Male employees suffering from physical disabilities, however, were required to document their continuing physical impairment in order to remain eligible for disability status. In any case, male employees could
receive a maximum of ninety days' leave, regardless of the severity of the
disability. 97 As Harness argued, the disparate policies militated unfairly
against male employees, who were faced with a maximum ninety-day
leave for disability reasons while female employees could take up to a
year for non-disability reasons.
The Harness court, relying solely on Guerra, permitted the "preferential treatment accorded pregnant employees by the [employer's] polBefore the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 124-26
(1989) (statement of the National Federation of Independent Business). Any employer
must place limits on the extent to which it will cover such costs. Especially considering
that males generally earn more and are more expensive to replace temporarily, see supra
note 90, an employer with limited resources may well decide to provide childrearing leave
benefits where they are needed most and where they are most cost-effective-to women.
93. 877 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 728 (1990).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 1308.
96. Id. at 1308-09.
97. See id. at 1308.
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icy."9 8 Although the court did not attempt to define "pregnancy
disability," the Sixth Circuit undoubtedly recognized that the employer's

"maternity related" leave policy went beyond the period of actual physical disability due to pregnancy to include non-disability childrearing
leave. The employer policy at issue in Harness did not confine itself to
actual physical disability, and it extended new mothers' leave to a full
year-well beyond the average expected disability period.
Thus, the court seemed to extend the Guerra rationale and apply it to a
childrearing situation that did not involve actual physical disability due
to pregnancy. Although it may be argued that the Sixth Circuit simply
misconstrued the employer policy in Harness and viewed it solely as a
pregnancy disability leave, this seems unlikely in light of the fact that it
was a year-long leave period that did not require new mothers to provide
documentation of continuing disability. Instead, the court seems to have
adopted the preferential treatment principle set forth in Guerra and to
have applied it broadly to encompass leaves that combine pregnancy disability leave with childrearing leave. In effect, the court's holding provides that women seeking leave for childrearing purposes may be allowed
to take substantially longer leave than men who seek leave for disabilityrelated reasons. In other words, a woman who does not suffer from a
disability may receive preferential treatment relative to a man who does
suffer disability if the woman's purpose for leave is to care for her newborn infant. Thus, although the Harness court was not specifically faced
with a man's claim to childrearing leave, its decision fully endorses preferential treatment for women seeking childrearing leave and is clearly
based upon underlying principles of equal opportunity.
4. Policy Rationales Underlying Application of the Equal
Opportunity View to Childrearing Leave Benefits
Several interlocking policy rationales support the application of an
equal opportunity view to the question of childrearing leave benefits.
First, an equal opportunity approach recognizes that even though women need not be the exclusive providers of infant care in our society, they
in fact constitute practically all employees who choose to take childrearing leave benefits. 99 As such, women are harmed most by policies excluding such leave. In order to continue full participation in the
workplace, women may require the assistance of voluntary employer "affirmative action" in the form of childrearing leave. In this sense, an
equal opportunity view fulfills the goal of "eliminat[ing] manifest ...
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.""
Second, an equal opportunity approach allows employers to undertake
voluntary action to assist women in the work force when childrearing
98. Il at 1310.
99. See Frug, Labor Market Hostility, supra note 86; Lawson, supra note 73, at Cl,
col. 1, C8, col. 3-6.
100. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207-08 n.7 (1979)
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leave benefits are necessary to ensure continued employment. Moreover,
if employers are required to provide childrearing leave to both sexes,
businesses might do away with childrearing leave altogether, out of fear
that too many men might choose such leave, driving the costs of such
benefits beyond acceptable levels and disrupting the workplace to an unmanageable extent.101
C. Resolving the Debate With Respect to ChildrearingLeave Benefits
Ultimately, if one accepts the notions that childrearing leave benefits
are a legitimate tool for achieving affirmative action goals and that the
policy rationale of Guerra extends beyond situations involving actual
pregnancy-related disability, the debate must be resolved on policy
grounds.
Fortunately, such a basis for resolution does emerge from a juxtaposition of the equal opportunity and equal treatment views. It is an inescapable conclusion that if an equal opportunity approach were invoked
to allow employers to provide childrearing leave benefits to women only,
such a practice would only harm women in the future by perpetuating
the stereotype of women as the caretakers of our society's infants. Certainly, working mothers benefit in the short run from policies providing
childrearing leave exclusively to them; however, over time such special
treatment can only reinforce the time-worn idea that women have two
jobs: one in the home and one at work.
Ironically, the equal treatment view, in avoiding the stereotype,
achieves a better position for women only by providing a benefit right to
men; that is, in order for women to be viewed as equals of men in the
workplace, fathers must be given equal rights to childrearing leave so
that mothers are not locked into their caretaking roles-and thus cyclical
employment-indefinitely. It would seem a rare instance where, in order
to advance opportunities for working women, a particular benefit must
be provided to working men.
The implications of this resolution for childrearing leave policies are
clear. While under Guerra female employees disabled due to pregnancy
may receive preferential treatment, once the disability period has
passed 10 2 a new mother may not be granted childrearing leave unless
men covered by the same policy may also receive such leave. In addition,
men and women must receive leaves of the same duration and must be
eligible for reinstatement on the same basis.
Very recently, the EEOC has concurred with this conclusion in an
101. On the other hand, employers who choose to provide no childrearing leave at all
may be open to challenges that such a practice has a discriminatory disparate impact on
women.
102. Of course, as described infra Part IV, "pregnancy disability" is not easily definable, which complicates the problem.
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internal agency interpretation." 3 Under the EEOC's view, childbirthrelated leaves granted to women that do not directly depend on the disability of the new mother would be considered "facially discriminatory"
unless extended to new fathers as well.1" In short, the EEOC has concluded that "the employer must justify any disparity [between men and
women] in parental leave by proving that [such disparity] is attributable
to the women's disability."1 '
Clearly, this interpretation adopts an
equal treatment approach, and is designed to protect mothers from perpetuated societal discrimination while at the same time protecting fathers
against deprivation of their family rights. Equally clear is the fact that
the multitude of employer policies that admittedly favor women in the
provision of childrearing leave benefits are open to challenge." 6
IV.

DEFINING "PREGNANCY DISABILrrY"

As noted in Part II above, the Supreme Court in Guerra confined its
decision to situations involving "actual physical disability" due to pregnancy, yet the Court failed to define this key phrase. In order to determine when pregnancy disability ends and when pure childrearing begins,
however, pregnancy disability itself must be precisely defined.
Consider a typical employer policy that provides twelve weeks of maternity leave for new mothers. Under a narrow definition of pregnancy
disability, actual disability might be defined as only that period during
which an expectant or new mother is totally incapacitated due to her
pregnancy. Accordingly, under such a restrictive definition, the portion
of overall maternity leave attributable to physical disability would be relatively short-because the period of total incapacity due to pregnancy is
relatively short-and the portion attributable to childrearing would be
correspondingly long. Conversely, under a broader definition of pregnancy disability in which physical impairment less than total incapacity
might still be considered pregnancy disability, the disability period would
be relatively long and the childrearing portion correspondingly shorter.
Thus, the amount of childrearing leave available to women under maternity leave policies of fixed duration depends on the precise definition of
pregnancy disability, since childrearing leave does not begin until pregnancy disability leave ends. Moreover, the precise definition of pregnancy disability potentially affects men by influencing the length of the
childrearing leave to which new fathers may be entitled, since a man's
103. See ProgramsLimited to New Mothers Open to Challenge of Bias, Pens. Rep.
(BNA) No. 49, at 2009-10 (Dec. 3, 1990).
104. Id. at 2010.
105. Id. (quoting Commission's internal notice to agency personnel in August 1990).
106. See id.; see also The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R.
770 Before the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 183
(1989) (1988 survey conducted by American Society for Personnel Administration reporting that while 44% of employer respondents provided unpaid childrearing leave to
women, only 19% offered a similar leave benefit to men).
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right to childrearing leave, if it exists, begins when a female fellow employee's pregnancy disability leave ends.
Courts considering claims alleging discrimination based on pregnancy
have seldom explicitly defined the scope and duration of actual pregnancy disability. These courts have, however, implicitly recognized or
rejected various approaches as legitimate methods of measuring, describing, or defining pregnancy disability. Therefore, examining judicial treatment of the term "pregnancy disability" may inform a determination of
when actual physical disability ends and pure childrearing begins.
Overall, a number of possible approaches for delineating the pregnancy disability period are suggested by court decisions, employer policies, and psychological literature. Yet no coherent definition has
emerged, and it seems likely that this uncertainty will plague courts, em07
ployers, and employees alike in implementing and evaluating policies.'
A.

Disability Status Determined by Employee's Physician

One obvious method of determining pregnancy disability status is to
defer to the physician of the pregnant or postpartum employee. In
Franco v. Phelps Dodge Corp.,"°8 for example, an employee claimed that
she had been illegally forced to take maternity leave despite her protests
that she was still able to work. The central dispute was whether she was
actually physically unable to work due to her pregnancy. In holding for
defendant employer, the district court afforded great deference to the determination by plaintiff's physician that she was unable to work, even
though plaintiff herself felt that she could continue on the job.° 9 As the
court noted, "if [p]laintiff's doctor initiated the leave, the [allegedly
forced] maternity leave would not be unlawful."' 1 0
Relying solely on a physician's recommendation to determine pregnancy disability, however, leaves great uncertainty for employer and employee alike. Some physicians may be quite strict in their diagnoses,
while others may allow the employee affected by pregnancy to take leave
or return to work whenever she feels ready."' In addition, an employee
eager to extend her maternity leave may be able to "shop around," or
draw upon her personal ties to a doctor, to obtain a medical certification
2
of disability even after certification is no longer warranted."
107. For discussion of various interpretations of pregnancy disability, see infra notes
108-26 and accompanying text.
108. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 116 (D.N.M. 1990).
109. See id. at 120 n.4.
110. Id. at 120 n.4.
111. Cf BNA, Pregnancyand Employment, supra note 1, at 203 (listing medical guidelines for employment during pregnancy disability, thus revealing range of discretion for
physicians when advising patients affected by pregnancy disability).
112. See id.
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B. Disability DeterminedAccording to Employer's Business Needs
Under another approach to defining when pregnancy disability begins,
it is the employer who determines when the pregnant employee is sufficiently disabled, based on the employer's business judgments about the
employee's ability to perform efficiently, safely, or to customers' satisfaction.1 13 Courts have seemingly endorsed the employer's use of discretion in determining that pregnant employees jeopardize customer
safety 14 or in deciding that a pregnant employee's "appearance and accompanying clumsiness" leads to "distress for [the employer's]
customers."'15

Clearly, allowing an employer to determine when an employee is or is
not disabled due to pregnancy is fraught with difficulty and is potentially
unfair to the employee herself. An employer's determination that an employee is too unstable or too unsightly for the workplace is hardly synonymous with the employee's actual physical disability due to pregnancy.
Therefore, total reliance on the employer's determination of an employee's disability status, even though it is work-related, seems to disregard an employee's actual ability to work-a factor that the PDA
explicitly emphasizes. 116
C. Disability in Relation to Flexibility of Job Definitions
Another variant on how pregnancy disability is defined relates to
whether an employer chooses to accommodate a pregnant or postpartum
employee by changing job requirements or schedules.117 Clearly, an employee who is so accommodated-for example, by an employer's decision
to do away with the heavy lifting requirements of a pregnant employee's
113. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. But see Ponton v. Newport News
School Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1986) (no school business justification for
requiring unmarried pregnant teacher to take leave of absence); Gardner v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249, 259-66 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, 905 F.2d 1457 (11 th Cir.
1990) (business necessity rejected for mandatory leave during first two trimesters);
Newmon v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238, 246-47 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (no business
justification for mandatory leave even after fifth month of pregnancy). See generally Remmers, ParentalLeave, supra note 8, at 386 (reviewing business necessity decisions).
114. For instance, in Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.
1980), the Ninth Circuit upheld an employer policy requiring that flight attendants be
placed on leave automatically upon becoming pregnant in order to ensure customer
safety. See id. at 678-79.
115. See EEOC v. Chateau Normandy, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 598, 604 (S.D. Ind. 1987)
(dismissing motion for preliminary injunction against employer policy). But see EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1990) (customer preference does not justify discrimination); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (same).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
117. The subject of employer accommodation of disabled employees is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a general discussion of the topic, however, see generally B. Schlei
& P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, supra note 19, at 287-89 (discussing
employer obligations to reasonably accommodate).
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job 114 -will be able to work longer before needing to take leave due to
pregnancy disability, and will be able to return to work sooner after giving birth. If an employee disabled due to pregnancy is not so accommodated, however, her disability would force her to leave work sooner or
further delay her return from leave after childbirth." 9
Whether employer accommodation is required is thus crucial in determining when pregnancy disability 1dave should properly be deemed to
have commenced or terminated. Until courts clarify this question, the
duration of employees' pregnancy disability leaves will vary drastically
from employer to employer depending on the leave policies involved.
D.

"Quasi-" Disabilities

Yet another pressing question in properly characterizing pregnancy
disability is whether post-delivery phenomena such as breastfeeding and
postpartum depression should be included in the calculation of the disability period. The few courts that have addressed this aspect of pregnancy disability appear to have been skeptical.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for instance, held that although
breastfeeding, postpartum anxiety, and other stressful conditions following delivery may be considered logical and natural extensions of childbirth-related disability, they are nonetheless outside the scope of
pregnancy disability as contemplated by typical employer policies.' 20
Similarly, the court in Barrashv. Bowen 121 found that a female employee
with a newborn child was not entitled to an extended pregnancy leave,
despite her doctor's recommendation that such a leave be taken for medical and psychological reasons and to allow for breastfeeding of the infant.
As the Fourth Circuit stated in Barrash,limitations upon maternity leave
118. In Fields v. Bolger, 723 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1984), the Sixth Circuit determined
that the United States Postal Service was not required to give "light duty" assignments to
a pregnant employee. As the court pointed out, "[n]othing in Title VII compels an em-

ployer to prefer for alternative employment an employee who, because of pregnancy, is
unable to perform her full range of duties." Id. at 1220. In a more recent case, however,
the Eighth Circuit held that a pregnant employee whose physician recommended that she

"refrain from pushing or lifting without assistance" should have been accommodated by

her employer rather than forced out on maternity leave. See Carney v. Martin Luther

Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 644, 649 (8th Cir. 1987).
119. Interestingly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's [hereinafter
EEOC] "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex" suggest that some accommodation may in fact be required for pregnant or postpartum employees. Question and Answer 12 of the guidelines states that "[a]n employer cannot refuse to hire a women [sic]
because of her pregnancy-related condition so long as she is able to perform the major
functions necessary to the job."

See 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1990) (emphasis added). Ex-

tending the principle set forth by this EEOC statement to the context of maternity leave
policies, it is a logical inference that an employer may likewise not discriminate against a
pregnant employee by forcing her to commence leave as long as she is able to perform the
major functions-not all the functions-necessary to a job.
120. See Board of School Directors of Fox Chapel Area School Dist. v. Rosetti, 488
Pa. 125, 411 A.2d 486 (1979).
121. 846 F.2d 927, 928-30 (4th Cir. 1988).
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"would have an adverse impact upon young mothers wishing to nurse
their babies for six months, but that is not the kind of disparate impact
that would invalidate [a ' policy],
for it shows no less favorable treatment
122
of women than of men."
Despite such court determinations, research on postpartum conditions
of new mothers suggests that psychological factors may be as disabling as
physical ailments related to childbirth. 2 3 Moreover, postpartum stress
affects a substantial proportion of new mothers, 21 whose condition may
be aggravated by a premature return to work 2 5 and who may continue
to suffer its effects well beyond the period of physical recovery from pregnancy. 126 These findings would seem to compel a conclusion that any
realistic maternity leave policy should take psychological factors into account in determining the actual post-pregnancy disability period of an
employee.
E. A Realistic Model
Any useful definition of pregnancy disability must respond to practical
demands. First, because the ability of women to return to work after
childbirth varies widely, some weight must be given to the judgment of
the individual employee and her physician in determining when disability
has ceased. On the other hand, employers must have some assurance
that employees are not abusing pregnancy leave benefits, and, accordingly, a useful standard for determining the bounds of pregnancy disability should also incorporate a mechanism that enables employers to
independently monitor a continuing disability claimed by an employee
on leave. This might be achieved by requiring the employee to submit to
examination by an employer-sponsored doctor for verification. Finally,
because it is in the best interests of employee and employer alike for the
employee who so desires to resume productivity as soon as possible after
childbirth, the determination of pregnancy disability should take into account an employer's ability to accommodate a postpartum employee by
122. Id.at 932.
123. See generally Hopkins, Marcus, & Campbell, Postpartum Depression:A Critical

Review, 95 Psychological Bull. 498, 501-03 (1984) (reviewing research findings of "maternity blues," postpartum psychosis, and postpartum depression).
124. See Whiffen, Vulnerability to Postpartum Depression: A Prospective Multivariate

Study, 97 J. Abnormal Psychology 467, 471 (1988) [hereinafter Whiffen, Vulnerability to
PostpartumDepression];O'Hara, Neunaber, & Zekovski, Prospective Study of Postpartum
Depression: Prevalence Course, and Predictive Factors,93 J. Abnormal Psychology 158,

163 (1984) [hereinafter O'Hara, et al., Prospective Study].
125. See generally Whiffen, Vulnerability to PostpartumDepression, supra note 124, at

472 (life stress accounts for some variance in postpartum symptom levels); O'Hara, et al.,
ProspectiveStudy, supra note 124, at 165 (life stress accounts for sizeable share of postpartum depression).
126. See Whiffen, Vulnerability to Postpartum Depression, supra note 124, at 471 (16.5

percent of new mothers were diagnosed with depression at eight weeks postpartum);
O'Hara, et al., Prospective Study, supra note 124, at 163 (some percentage of women
suffer depression even six months postpartum).
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implementing flexible job assignments, part-time work schedules, and
phased return from leave. In other words, courts and employers should

recognize that if an employee's job requirements or work schedule can be
modified temporarily to minimize fatigue and physical demands, that

employee may be able to continue working longer before leave commences-and may be able to return sooner from disability leave. Such a

balanced approach would take into account the business needs of the
employer while recognizing that the bounds of pregnancy disability inevitably vary from individual to individual.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE'S RESOLUTION FOR FEDERAL
AND STATE PARENTAL LEAVE LAWS

In recognition of the growing demand for childrearing leave benefits, a
number of states have passed-and Congress has repeatedly attempted to
enact-laws requiring some type of parental leave. 27 Such legislative
action attempts to provide equal opportunity for women in the workplace as well as, in some instances, equal treatment for new fathers. 128
Many of the current and proposed laws, however, do not necessarily
carry through on their promises of equal treatment. Specifically, some
state laws provide leave provisions only for new mothers; 12 9 others, along

with proposed Congressional legislation of the past several years, require
that employers provide a set number of weeks of leave to men and women alike, yet make no distinction between the period of leave attributa30
ble to pregnancy disability and that attributable to pure childrearing.1
As a result, some laws seem to discriminate against new fathers by omitting them from leave consideration. 3 ' Others, however, tend to favor
127. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 770 Before the
House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1989); Cal. Gov't
Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5-248a (West Supp. 1991);
Mass. Ann. Laws cl. 149, § 105D (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1991); Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 49-2-310 to -311 (1989). See also Family Leave Bills Introduced; SponsorsExpect Passage in 1991, Ben. Today (BNA) No. 2, at 29 (Jan. 25, 1991) (describing newly-introduced legislation); House Labor Committee Approves Proposed Family, Medical Leave
Bill, Ben. Today (BNA) No. 7, at 100 (Apr. 5, 1991) (same); Senator Dodd, Administration Official to Discuss Family Leave Legislation, Ben. Today (BNA) No. 9, at 131 (May
3, 1991) (same).
128. For examples of state provisions and proposed federal legislation, see sources
cited supra note 127.
129. See Cal. Gov't Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149,
§ 105D (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1991); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 49-2-310 to -311 (1989).
130. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 770 Before the
House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1989); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 5-248a (West Supp. 1991); see also Family Leave Bills Introduced; Sponsors
Expect Passage in 1991, Ben. Today (BNA) No. 2, at 29 (Jan. 25, 1991) (describing
newly-introduced legislation); House Labor Committee Approves ProposedFamily, Medical Leave Bill, Ben. Today (BNA) No. 7, at 100 (Apr. 5, 1991) (same); Senator Dodd,
Administration Official to DiscussFamily Leave Legislation, Ben. Today (BNA) No. 9, at
131 (May 3, 1991) (same).
131. See supra note 129.
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working fathers because, for example, under some statutes a woman
might use up six or eight weeks of her statutorily-mandated leave in a
condition of pre- and/or post-pregnancy disability, and have only four or
six weeks of leave remaining to devote to childrearing. New fathers, on
the other hand, would receive a full twelve weeks of childrearing leave
under some statutes, 132 thus receiving obvious but apparently unintended
preferential treatment.
If equal treatment with respect to childrearing leave is to be embodied
in state and federal parental leave laws, legislators must take note, as the
Supreme Court did in Guerra, of the distinction between leaves due to
pregnancy disability and leaves taken solely for child care purposes.
Pregnancy disability leaves, available only to women, are designed to accommodate new mothers during periods of actual physical disability
when work for an employer is precluded. Childrearing leave, however, is
a matter of personal and family choice, and men and women must have
equal access to it under the same employer policy in order for the purposes of Title VII to be fully implemented.
CONCLUSION

Although male employees have seldom challenged childrearing leave
policies favoring working women, employers must be aware that such
policies-although perhaps designed to accommodate working
mothers-may well be found to be discriminatory. Courts should antici-

pate increased challenges to employer policies-given the prevalence of
dual career couples and the growing interest of men in family participation-and must be prepared to distinguish between leaves based on pregnancy disability and those based purely on childrearing. Policies that do
not attempt to draw a line between these two types of leave may conceal
elements of preferential treatment that are fundamentally inconsistent
with the purposes of Title VII.
132. See supra note 130.

